UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

THE INTELLECT IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ST. THOMAS

FRANCIS PALMER CLARKE

A THESIS

IN PHILOSOPHY

PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL IN
PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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PREFATORY NOTE

The aim of this study is primarily expository: to present to the reader an account of the view of St. Thomas Aquinas as presented in his own words, on the nature of the human intellect and its functions.

Aside from the briefer treatment in handbooks dealing with the philosophy of St. Thomas as a whole, the expositors write largely with an apologetic or polemical aim. In English, there is a total absence of even such accounts.

The method of procedure throughout has been to analyze the writings of St. Thomas himself, on the assumption that where difficulties occur they will best be solved by further reading in his other treatments of the subject, rather than by reference to commentaries.

The order of procedure is: (I) the functions of the mind or soul in general; (II) the functions of the speculative intellect in detailed analysis; (III) the active intellect as faculty of the individual soul and as linked with the Divine Intellect; (IV) the conclusions which may be drawn as to the presuppositions of the act of thinking; and finally (V) the object and goal of intellectual activity.

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I

The Functions of the Soul

We speak indifferently of the intellectual functions of man or of the rational part of the soul, for the intellect is a "part" of the human soul only in the sense that it has a separate function; for the entire soul forms but one substance; so that there are not three souls in man (intellectual, sensitive, vegetative), but one only, manifesting itself in these three activities.[1]

The soul as form, or more properly as substantial form, gives unity to the body; and because of the hierarchical arrangement the intellectual soul includes within it the other two faculties. [cf. De An. 2. ad 8m.][2] "The rational soul gives to the human body whatever the sensible soul gives to the brute, the vegetable soul to plants, and something further; and for this reason it itself is in man both vegetable and sensible and rational." The same conclusion is reached through the consideration that there can be but one substantial form: "Thus, since the soul is the substantial form, for it constitutes man in a determinate species of substance, there is not some other substantial form intermediate between soul and prime matter; but man is perfected by the rational soul itself according to the various grades of perfection, so that he is namely, body, and animate body, and rational animal."

By what function, then, is the intellect differentiated from sense; or, otherwise, in what manner does intellectual knowledge differ from sense knowledge?

First of all the relation of function in general to mind is as property to substance; that is, the faculties do not constitute the essence of mind. *Potentia* in the sense of faculty is defined thus:[3] "Faculty (potentia) is nothing other than a principle of some operation or other, whether active or passive; not indeed the principle which is the active or passive subject; but that by which the agent acts or the recipient is acted upon."

The relations of faculty to mind are then established. The mind or soul in its essence is but one principle; the faculties are

many and diverse. It can not act then immediately through its own essence, but only mediately through these inherent principles which are related to it as accidents or properties.[4]

The sense in which these faculties can be spoken of as *parts* of the soul is expressed as follows:[5] "The faculties of the soul are not essential parts of it as though constituting its essence; but potential (or facultative) parts, for the power of the soul is differently manifested through these faculties."

An excellent résumé of the cognitive faculties is contained in the following:[6] "For perfect sense-cognition, which suffices for an animal, five things are required. First, that sense receive the species from the sense object; and this pertains to the proper sense. Second, that judgment be made concerning the sensibles perceived, and that they be discriminated from one another; and this pertains to the common sense, to which all the sensibles pass. Third, that the sensibles which have been received should be conserved; for the animal needs to apprehend the sensibles not only when the sense-objects are actually present, but also after they have disappeared. Now this requires another faculty, for to receive and to retain are different functions. This faculty is called imagination or phantasy. Fourth, there is needed the perception of certain qualities which sense does not apprehend, such as the harmful and the useful. Now man comes to a knowledge of these by investigating and considering; but the other animals by a certain natural instinct, as the sheep instinctively flees the wolf as harmful; whence in other animals a power of instinctive estimation ('judgment') functions in this respect; but in man, a cogitative power, which is the comparison of particular intentions, and is accordingly called 'particular reason' and 'passive intellect'. Fifth, it is necessary that those qualities which have previously been apprehended by sense and have been retained, should again be recalled to present consideration; and this pertains to the power of recall; and this takes place in other animals without search, but in man through search and conscious effort; hence in man there is not only memory but also remembrance (recognition). . . . Now intellectual cognition requires two faculties: the active intellect, and the possible intellect." In addition to these faculties, there are the

appetitive: "Since that which acts is necessarily conjoined in some manner to that concerning which the activity is entered into, it is necessary that the external thing, which is the object of the activity of the soul, should be related to the soul in a two-fold way. In one, in so far as it exists in the mind through its likeness; and this pertains to the two faculties of cognition, sense, and intellect. In the other, the mind itself inclines towards the external thing; and for this relationship there are two faculties: one, appetitive, for which the external thing is the goal which is first in intention; the other, locomotive, in which the external object is the terminus of the act and activity, for any animal moves to obtain something desired and intended." It is clear then that the faculties are distinguished primarily on the basis of their activities or functions, secondarily by the objects toward which they are directed; for these latter in turn differentiate the activities.

The distinctive nature of intellect is established by an analysis of the process of abstraction:[7] "Since there is a great distance between intelligible being and material and sensible being, the form of a material thing cannot be at once received by the intellect, but the mind must be led up to it through many intermediate stages; namely, the form of any sense-object is first in the medium, where it is more spiritual than in the sensible thing; then it is in the organ of sense; from there it passes to the imagination and to the other lower faculties; and finally it is taken to the intellect." For "our intellect knows by means of species taken from things, and these species are abstracted from matter and from every material condition; and therefore it cannot know singulars but universals only." Intellectual activity then at once depends upon sense (or body), and transcends it in its operation; that is, it is extrinsically and not intrinsically dependent on body:[8] "Our intellect is constituted to acquire an immaterial knowledge from material, *i.e.* sense, knowledge. Thus then from the function of the human soul one can perceive the manner of its existence. For in as far as it has a function transcending the material, it is elevated above the body, and not dependent upon it; but in so far as it must by its nature acquire its immaterial knowledge from the material,

it is clear that it cannot exist in its completeness apart from union with the body. The final perfection of the human soul lies in the cognition of truth, which is attained through the intellect. But for such a perfecting of the soul in the cognition of truth, it must be united to the body, for the intellect functions through the phantasmata which cannot exist apart from the body. It is clear then that the sense faculties are necessary for our intellectual activity not only in the case of first acquiring knowledge, but also in the utilizing of knowledge already acquired. For we are not able to turn our thoughts even to those things of which we already have knowledge, unless we give our attention to the images." That this dependence on body is not such as to require a corporeal organ for intellect, will be clear from the later discussion; in fact it will be shown that it cannot have such an organ.

Finally, we find not only that intellect is the highest function of the soul; but that it is also its proper and defining activity, and is therefore included in the definition of man. This is not meant, however, in the sense that intellect is the essence of soul: we have seen that it is rather a faculty (Intellectus est aliqua potentia animae, et non ipsa animae essentia). Put otherwise, soul is the principle of intellect: "principium intellectualis operationis—quod dicimus animam hominis . . ."; though indeed Aquinas allows himself such expressions as this: "Relinquitur igitur animam humanam, quae dicitur intellectus vel mens, esse aliquid incorpoream et subsistens." At any rate, it is clear that the mind could not exist apart from its faculties:[9] "Since the functions of the soul are inherent properties consequent upon the species, it follows that the soul cannot exist apart from these functions. But granted that it could exist without the functions, nevertheless the mind would still be said to be specifically rational or intellectual, not because it actually had these faculties, but because it is the species of such a sort that from it these faculties naturally flow." We conclude then, "To understand is the highest and proper function of the soul." "Man is man in so far as he is rational. Therefore the soul is the proper form of man."

We turn next to that further analysis of intellect, resulting in

the distinction between possible and active reason. We have already seen that the term "passive intellect" is applied to the *vis cogitativa* which in man corresponds to the *aestimativa naturalis* of animals. The latter clearly enough belongs to the sensitive soul and not to the intellectual; in man the status seems uncertain. In addition to passive intellect it is called "particular reason" (ratio particularis). The distinction lies here not in the object—both deal with the noxious or the useful—but in the manner in which the estimations are reached; in animals they are instinctively, that is unconsciously, made; in man they result from processes of conscious search and comparison. Hence, it would seem that they should be included in the rational faculty. In that case, this activity would fall under the practical rather than the speculative reason. To classify it thus, however, is to overlook an important point: it deals only with the particular and not with the universal; hence it is not properly intellect or reason even in man, but rather one of the sensitive faculties. This is explicitly stated in the *Summa Theologica*:[10] "Other animals perceive intentions of this sort [*i.e.* of utility or harm] solely by a certain innate instinct, but man by a certain comparison. And accordingly what in other animals is called a power of natural estimation, in man is called a cogitative power, which attains to intentions of this sort through a certain comparison. Hence it is also called 'particular reason', to which the physicians assign a definite organ, namely the median part of the brain. For it is the comparison of individual intentions, as the intellectual reason is the comparison of universal intentions."

The passive intellect, then, like the sense appetites, is not, properly speaking, a part of the intellectual soul, but is rational by participation. It fails on two points: it deals only with particulars; it has a bodily organ.[11] "But the intellect functions in respect to *being* taken universally." "It is impossible that the intellect function through any corporeal organ."

Clearly, then, we must distinguish the passive intellect as used above from the possible (or, as sometimes written, *passible*) intellect. The meaning of this latter is discovered in the analysis of the functions of the speculative intellect. I say, of the speculative intellect, for we have throughout been considering questions

of cognition only, as though the intellect had but the one, the speculative, aspect. We should then consider also the practical and its relation to will, before proceeding to deal exclusively with the functions of the speculative intellect. We find then that the terms "speculative intellect" and "practical intellect" designate one and the same faculty; the differentiation rests on the object.[12] If it is concerned solely with apprehending the truth, it is termed speculative; if it considers the truth as related to activity, which falls outside itself, it is termed practical. If we consider the difference in object from another point of view, it would seem that the difference in faculty would follow; namely, that the object of the practical intellect is the *good;* that of the speculative, the *true.* This indeed identifies the practical intellect with the will. The objection is answered by applying the preceding distinction.[13] "The true and the good include one another. For the true is a certain good, otherwise it would not be desirable; and the good is something true, otherwise it would not be intelligible. As therefore the object of an appetite (including will) can be true, in so far as it has the definition of the good, as when one seeks to know truth; so the object of the practical intellect is the good as related to some activity, under the definition of the true. For the practical intellect knows the truth, just as the speculative does; but it relates the truth as known to an activity."

Thus the practical intellect, as well as the speculative, is distinguished from will; for the latter is not the knowledge of, but the desire for, the good. Now these two must be distinguished, though they also are dependent. For in animals desire follows upon apprehension. In man there must be also the same distinctions in desire or appetite as in apprehension or knowledge; viz. sense and intellect. But intellectual desire is precisely what we mean by will.[14]

The relation then of will to intellect is complex. In an absolute sense, the intellect moves the will; for one can desire an object as good, only provided he has apprehended it as such.[15] The will, however, also moves the intellect; for the universal good is the final end of man and as such is first of all the object of the will and thus also the final cause which activates all

the other faculties. The clearest case in which the will moves the intellect would seem to be that of faith or belief [cf. De Ver. 14.1 and 2.] In such a case the conflicting evidence is such as to leave the intellect undecided (when the evidence is clear, its very objective cogency necessarily moves the intellect to acquiescence). But there may be sufficient reasons to move the will to a decision, such as practical needs or some other good sought. Thus in such a case the will is said to move the intellect.[16]

We turn now to the analysis of the functions of the speculative intellect.

II

The Functions of the Speculative Intellect

As we have already seen, that which characterizes the human intellect is the knowledge of universals and the activity of abstraction by which they are reached. These universals are the forms existing in the concrete natural objects; though this method of existence, and the manner in which they exist in the mind, must indeed differ. In perception they are grasped by sense as the "species sensibiles"; that is, the form of the stone is in the sense faculty, and not the stone itself. Hence, since the real existence of the form is in the stone, the sensible species has already undergone a certain degree of spiritualization. It is still, however, a particular; it is still material. With the cessation of perception, the effect is not entirely removed, the *species sensibilis* becomes the image or phantasm in the sense-memory. From this in turn the intellect abstracts the *species intelligibilis*, which is the universal.

Now the universals are really in the things, though not actually intelligible apart from the activity of reason upon them. Hence, Aquinas does not hesitate to say that the intellect knows the things; otherwise science would deal only with the imagery in the mind, and not with external reality.[17] That is, the stone is "id quod intelligitur"; the intelligible species, "id quo intelligitur". Yet this defence of natural science must not be understood to mean that the *individual* is the direct object of intellectual knowledge; for the latter is only indirectly known. It should, of course, be clear that the material conditions which the intellect cannot directly apprehend are those of the concrete individual, the "materia signata" which makes a stone *this* stone. Matter in so far as it enters into the definition of anything is known; this is "materia sensibilis communis"; as also "materia intelligibilis" which is substance as underlying quantity.[18]

The manner of this reflective knowledge of particulars is discussed at greater length in De Veritate, q. 10 5c.[19] "Mind is per accidens admixed with singulars, in so far as it is conjoined

with the sense faculties which are directed towards particulars. One aspect of this relation leads to a reflexive knowledge of these particulars. For in so far as the activity of the sensitive part ends in the mind, the mind by knowing its own proper object, which is some universal nature (or quiddity) is led back to a knowledge of its own activity, and then to the species which is the principle of its activity. But this species is abstracted from the phantasmata, which in turn derive from sense cognition. Hence, through such an analysis of its own activity the mind attains a certain knowledge of singulars."

Thus the very process of reflection by which the mind shows that it has no proper and immediate grasp of the individual, is itself a reflective and indirect knowledge of that particular. That it must have some sort of knowledge of the particular is obvious, else it could make no singular judgments. In the case of the "moral syllogism", however, the minor premiss (which is singular, "This act is honest"), or the judgment, if such it can be called, is not made by the intellect, but by the "ratio particularis", which belongs, as we have seen, to the sensitive soul. (cf. De Ver. 10, immediately following the above quotation.) Why cannot a similar condition obtain in the case of the speculative syllogism? In a way, this is the case; for it is only by reflection on the phantasm that the intellect knows the particular and forms the judgment, *e.g.*, "Socrates is a man". (cf. S. Th. 1.86. 1c.) But the phantasm resides in the sense-memory, not in the intellect. Hence, for the intellectual apprehension of the singular, whether speculative or practical, a sense-faculty is necessary.

Perhaps we may connect with this problem of the intellectual knowledge of particulars, the more general problem not only of science, but of the transmission of science, *i.e.*, teaching. It is clear from the principles set forth that we have here the solution to both problems: first, how, if science is properly of universals, and yet reality in the full sense of the term is only in the concrete individual, science may still be said to be of reality; second, how the science of reality may be transmitted. For after all, every term used in discourse is a universal, and yet we deal even thus with reality. One must distinguish then between what we might call the logical value and the evocative. The latter relies

indeed on immediate experience in some sense, on "intuition", on a certain surd quality, element, residue, which can never be comprised in any conceptual formula. (It is obvious of course, that the very discussion of it illustrates the distinction I am trying to draw: for in calling it a quality or element, I am clearly enough using some of the most universal of categories; I am doing so in the hope that a necessarily inadequate description prove adequate for evocation and recognition.)

Hence, even in the transmission of science not alone are the universal truths transmitted, but for the final and full understanding there is ultimately reliance on the immediate sense experiences which alone invest the discourse with meaning; for without sense universals are without sense. The words then are but symbols; and since as universals they are abstracted from sensation, so as meaningful they must reinvoke their sensuous basis, or remain but empty sounds. But this sense experience is not contained in the words themselves; or transmitted by them: one after all only describes as best one may, in the hopes that his auditor shall thereby recognize in his own experience (which as his own, is so far forth unique and incommunicable) that which is being described in terms not individual and unique, but universal, that is common, that is communicable.

I utilize from several discussions by Aquinas of the nature of teaching, that given in De Veritate, 11, 1, on the question:[20] "Whether man can teach another and be called master, or God alone." The eleventh objection reads: "Science is nothing other than a description of things in the mind, since science is said to be the assimilation of the knower to the thing known. But one man cannot describe the characteristics of things in the mind of another; for this would be to act within another person; but this is possible to God alone. Therefore one man cannot teach another." In reply: "To the eleventh objection it must be stated in reply, that in the pupil there are described the intelligible forms, from which the science acquired through teaching is constituted, immediately, to be sure, by the active intellect, but mediately by him who teaches. For the teacher sets forth the signs of the intelligible things, from which the active intellect takes the intelligible intentions and meanings,

and describes them in the possible intellect. Hence, when the words themselves of the teacher are heard, or seen in writing, they are related in the same manner to establishing science in the intellect as the things which are outside the mind. For, from both, the intellect receives intelligible intentions; although the words of the teacher are more closely related to causing science than the sensibles existing outside the mind, in so far as they are signs of the intelligible intentions."

A difficulty, however, still remains with our former problem. It is by the action of the intellect upon the phantasm that the intelligible species is formed, through which the mind grasps reality; that is, the universal nature of the thing as its direct object. But is not the phantasm a particular? And what activity of the intellect upon the phantasm can there be except that of knowing?

The phantasm is actually the likeness of the sensible species; hence, singular. Potentially however, it is intelligible, *i.e.*, it is the "matter" for the intelligible species. To bring it from this potentiality to actuality, in other words, to form the intelligible species, another activity than that of knowing is required. In fact this activity is one of the presuppositions of knowing, and not the act of knowing itself. But, every activity is the activity of a faculty. The faculty then which makes actual the merely potentially intelligible (*i.e.*, the phantasm) is the active intellect. It is then the power of abstraction. (cf. S. Th. 1.79.4 ad 4m.)

We are not, however, always thinking. The intellect cannot be then pure actuality, for this would be unceasing activity. We must distinguish within it a passive aspect as well as an active. This is the potential or possible intellect. (We have already seen that the term "passive intellect" is applied to one of the sensitive faculties.) But the potential is brought from potentiality to actuality only by what is already actual. For this reason also there must be an active intellect to account for this process. The possible intellect cannot be actualized by the intelligible species, for, as we have seen, these require the intellect itself to actualize them, since they do not exist (as universals) independently of the mind. The passage from the Summa Theologica, quoted above, must then be interpreted in this

sense; for the "forma intelligibilis", *i.e.*, "quod quid est" is the actualized universal which presupposes the operation of the active intellect. There must then be an active faculty which conjoined with the possible makes the actualized intellect (intellectus in actu). This latter then is the *act of knowing*, while the active intellect is a necessary presupposition of this act.

The intellect as a whole then is not always actualized, but is made so by the active intellect. This seems only to push the question back one step, for it would seem that the active intellect must be always functioning; hence, we would always be thinking.

There are, however, several requirements for thought.[21] "If the active intellect were related to the possible intellect as activating object to faculty, as the actually visible is related to the faculty of vision, it would follow that we would know everything at once; since the active intellect is that whose function it is to make all things. Now as a matter of fact it is not related as object, but as that which makes objects actual. And for this there is required in addition to the presence of the active intellect, that of the phantasmata, and the good disposition of the sense faculties, and experience in this manner of activity. For through one thing known others become known; as through terms, propositions, and through first principles, conclusions." Thus ultimately sensation itself may be considered a material though not the sole condition for thought.[22] These conditions account as well to a large extent for the differences in intellectual ability;[23] "for those in whom the imaginative and the cogitative faculties and the memory are better disposed, are better disposed for intellectual activity." They account as well for the fact that bodily disorders impede the operation of intellect.

These considerations can only mean that it is the nature of the active intellect to be always active; it needs then no other force or faculty to bring it into activity; its activity can however, be impeded by other forces and dispositions, namely, by bodily condition. Hence, we are not always thinking. There seems to remain, however, a certain ambiguity (it is indeed Aristotelian as well): the arguments for the necessity of the active reason rest on the correlation of potential and actual; nevertheless the

active intellect is not the *actualized* intellect; it is not the process of thought; for then the active intellect would be "vestitus specierum", for "intellectus in actu est intellectum in actu." The active intellect actualizes the *species intelligibles*; that is, by abstraction from the phantasmata which are potentially intelligible, it makes the species actually intelligible. It should then itself be the actually intelligible species; for the potential is made actual by the actual of the same genus. The potential intellect should also be actualized by the actual intellect; it is, however, actualized by the *active* intellect which clearly is to be distinguished from the actual intellect (or, in this case, actualized intellect), as also it is distinguished from the actual intelligible. A distinction of this sort is, however, unwarranted; for the actual and the actualizing or active are but two aspects of one and the same thing. A thing acts only in so far as it is actual. But this leads to radical changes in the psychological doctrine set forth.

If the activity of abstraction is the function of the active intellect, what is the function of the possible intellect? Its chief function is to be receptive of the forms, or intelligible species. There is also assigned to it in one passage the function of "considering or judging concerning the common nature". [De Sp. Cr. 10 c.] At the same time it is the active intellect which judges concerning truth [*ibid.* ad 8m]. Again in De Veritate [15.1. Sed contra 6] both seem to be assigned to the possible intellect.[24] But why should these activities be assigned to the possible intellect? Of course this term does not connote inactivity, but rather the need of some force outside itself to activate it. Nevertheless as *possible* it would seem far more the mere receptivity of the forms (Intellectus possibilis est quo est omnia fieri; intellectus agens, quo est omnia facere. . . . Operatio intellectus possibilis est recipere intelligibilia; [et] . . . propria operatio intellectus agentis est abstrahere ea.); or, as equivalent to "intellectus in habitu", the intellectual memory; than as having per se the functions enumerated. These functions as such would seem to belong to the intellect, undifferentiated (or, perhaps better expressed, the intellect conjoined, *i.e.*, actualized). Consider, for example, such a passage as the following:[25] "It is impossible to say that the active intellect is naked or clothed,

full of species or empty. For to be filled with species pertains to the possible intellect; to form them, to the active. But it must not be said that the active intellect understands apart from the possible; but man understands by means of both." Yet if we consider that these operations take place through the light of the active reason, it might seem plausible that the possible reason, through the active reason, thus engages in ratiocination. But since the conjunction of the active and the possible reason is simply the reason actualized, it seems preferable and more correct to assign these activities to reason as such. Yet this distinction remains: as *faculties* they pertain to possible reason; as actually operating, they (as possible reason) function *through* the active reason, and are thus the reason in activity (intellectus in actu). Hence we can enumerate the following distinctions:[26] "Some posit four intellects, sc., the active, the possible, the habitual, and the acquired. Of these four, the active and the possible are different faculties, as in all things the active faculty is one thing, and the passive, another. But the other three are differentiated as three states of the possible intellect; for at times it is potential only, and is then called possible; at times it is in the first actuality, which is science, and is then called habitual; and at times it is in the second actuality, and is then called actual or acquired."

Another distinction of faculties has been indicated; the intuitive and the discursive reason. In the discussion of the virtues or habits of the speculative reason a threefold classification is made: wisdom, science, intellect.[27] Of these, wisdom is the possession of the knowledge of the highest and ultimate causes of all things, and thus there is but one "wisdom". Science is the knowledge of the principles of a particular field or genus; and accordingly there are many sciences. Intellect denotes the first principles which are *per se notae;* whereas the other two deal with principles which are known *per aliud.*

It would seem that the only possible distinction between intellect (as habit) and wisdom, lay then in the fact that the intellect is the possession of the first principles *by* which, and wisdom of the first principles *from* which, demonstration proceeds.[28] These first principles, however, in either case become known as such through that same process of abstraction that is

necessary for any other intellectual knowledge.[29] They are "per se nota" in the same sense then that they are ultimate and irreducible.[30] The *per se nota* then in this usage is practically synonymous with *primum principium*.[31]

These first principles are indeed *known* through a process of abstraction, and this is the function of the intellect (intellectus); this may, however, be separated into two activities: the immediate intuition of the quiddities or natures, and the formation or enunciation of propositions (compositio et divisio). Concerning the former the intellect cannot be deceived except per accidens; for the quiddity is the proper object of the intellect; and intellect, like sense, cannot be deceived in regard to its proper object. In respect to judgments, however, deception is possible.[32] As contrasted with these two, but more particularly with the former, is the function of discursive reason or ratiocination (ratio). The distinction, nevertheless, is only relative; ratiocination is rather the *process*, intuition the *possession*, of that which the process reveals. The distinction might be put thus: the process in which the steps of the proof are presented and developed, is not precisely the same as the process by which the cogency of the proof is impressed upon us. It is to be noted, moreover, that the process of *abstraction* and the process of ratiocination differ. The former is a function of the intellect; the latter of reason.[33]

Yet the two are both ultimately the activity of the same faculty. By intellection or understanding is meant the simple and immediate apprehension of truth; by ratiocination, the passing from one thing known to another, as in the syllogism. They are related then as a state of rest and perfection on the one hand, and a state of motion and imperfection on the other. The former is at once the source and the goal and completion of the latter. Yet it remains that our knowledge on the whole is attained by ratiocination; hence, man is defined as a *rational* animal; not as an intellectual being.[34] In fact discursive reason is a sign of the imperfect and finite nature of our intellects; the angels, as pure intelligences, know by the immediate act of the intuitive reason, without need of the painful processes of ratiocination. A fortiori, it is lacking in God; hence, error also is impossible to God.[35]

Through ratiocination then, the intellect is led up to the attainment of truth; but in ratiocination also there is the possibility of error. "The intellect does not err in the first principles; but it does sometimes in the conclusions to which it is brought by reasoning from the first principles."[36] But one of the functions of the intellect also admits of error: that of judgment. "As in the intellect in reasoning the conclusion is related to the (first) principle, so in the intellect in judging the predicate is related to the subject. For if our intellect could see the truth of the conclusion immediately in the principle itself, intellectual activity would never take place by discursion or ratiocination. Similarly if our intellect could have immediately in the apprehension of the quiddity of the subject, the knowledge of all those things which can be attributed to the subject or denied of it; it would never understand by composition [affirmation] or division [negation], but solely by comprehending the quiddity." The necessity of judgment and ratiocination in the attainment of truth rests on the fact that the intellect passes from potentiality to actuality; hence its perfection in knowledge is the result of gradual acquisition and not of immediate intuition. The latter, as we have seen, is always true in its operation, unless it is deceived per accidens; the former operations, *i.e.* judgment and reasoning, admit of error.[37] It is difficult, however, to see how the simple apprehension of quiddities can properly be said to be *true*, since truth and falsity are applied rather to judgments. "The truth of the intellect is the assimilation of intellect and thing, according to which the intellect states that what exists, exists; or what does not exist, does not exist." "There is a twofold operation of our intellect. One by which it forms the simple quiddities of things, as that of man, or of animal; and in this operation there is not found the true as such nor the false, as also those are not found in simple terms. The other operation of the intellect is that by which it affirms or denies; and in this there is found the true and the false, as also in terms in composition which is the sign of this activity."[38] But if truth is to be applied to the simple apprehension of the intellect, so also must falsity; for truth can only mean, that what is taken to be the quiddity is actually such; but if one is mistaken in the quiddity,

then the apprehension is false. Otherwise the intellect only acts when the evidence is so cogent that error is impossible; and this really seems to be Thomas' point: the act of the intellect is true, or else "we know nothing at all". This question of truth as applied to the immediate operation of the intellect (*i.e.*, the apprehension of quiddities) is discussed at length in Contra Gentiles in connection with the manner in which God ascertains the truth. In simple apprehension, the term, or quiddity, is considered in itself, and not explicitly in relation to other terms (or objects). Hence, it cannot properly be said to be "adequate" to the object it represents; but this adequacy is expressed rather in the judgment. Hence, it is only to the judgment that "true" and "false" properly apply. Yet there is necessarily an implicit reference even in simple apprehension, for it is reality that is apprehended; consequently the intellect in its operation of apprehension of the definition or quiddity, can be said to be "true", in so far as definition contains more than simple apprehension, and is at least an implicit judgment.[39]

We might note in passing certain conclusions which can be drawn from these principles. Ratiocination is the process of deduction from such quiddities and first principles: hence, logic deals with reality primarily: it is concerned with the existent, the true; and not with relations only. It follows therefore that logic cannot be merely formal or symbolic.

Through abstraction from the data of sense, through judgment and syllogism, there is built up then a body of knowledge, science, or sciences. All the science thus acquired remains in the intellectual memory, or, more accurately, in the "intellectus in habitu". As such, it lacks those qualities of date and the like which characterize sense-memory, or reminiscence; for these are among the individuating qualities from which the intelligible species has been freed. It can, however, date its own acts, at least as past or present; because these though singular are immaterial.[40]

We have presented two problems: why is intellectual memory necessary; how are the acts of intellect individuated?

The first forces itself upon us because of the requirements for thought: all intellectual activity requires imagery. This is

necessary, it seems, not only for the first acquisition of knowledge, but as well for its continued use.[41] If this be the case, why is it necessary that the intelligible species abstracted from the image remain in the intellect at all? Why may not each recall be but the renewed abstraction, since in any case the image is required? Yet it is insisted that these species as distinct from the images remain in the intellect as science, or in habitu in the possible intellect; and accordingly there is an intellectual memory distinct from the sense-memory.[42]

The implicit grounds of this argument seem to be: the active intellect abstracts the universals from the phantasmata, which are only potentially intelligible, and as such are in the sensitive memory (or, more properly, imagination). As universals these species thus abstracted clearly enough can exist only in the intellect. It is obvious also that such intellectual knowledge once attained is not utterly lost; hence these species remain in the intellect. But not being actual, in the sense of not being the present object of knowledge, they can remain only in the *intellectus in habitu* (since that is the meaning of habit as applied to science); and this as we have seen, is the possible intellect. Hence it is called the *locus specierum*. But the difficulty lies precisely in the premiss that the universals even when not known as such remain in the intellect. It might seem that this is not different from the problem of retention in the sense-memory. In the latter case, however, the material traces can remain, and, since sense-memory is directly dependent on the organism, this offers more plausible grounds for theory. Furthermore these retained traces, as phantasmata, fulfil a definite function: for these phantasmata with their basis in the physical organism are necessary for all thought. What part then do the abstr cted species in habitu really play? Were the phantasmata necessary only for the first process of asbtraction, so that thereafter "imageless" thought could utilize the attained science, this difficulty would disappear. The only arguments against this position are drawn from the results of organic lesions: not only is further learning thereby affected, but also the utilization of the knowledge already acquired. An additional argument is to be sure presented if account be taken of the activity of the soul after death,

when separated from the body; for lacking the body and the sensitive faculties, intellectual activity is made possible by the inflowing species, which are the likeness of the ideal forms, which are in the divine mind. ("Speciebus influxis, quae sunt similitudines idealium formarum, quae sunt in mente divina." (cf. De An. 20 ad 6m). But since it is explicitly stated that this method of thought differs from that of the present life, this solution is irrelevant to the present problem.[43]

I conclude then that either the intellectual memory serves no real function; or else imageless thought must be admitted. It is sufficient to save the facts of "retained science" that there remain in the intellect an increased facility for thought and in the sense-memory or imagination, the images as potential forms for the actual processes of thought, since without these images there is no thought.

A view very like this is attributed by Aquinas to Avicenna in De Veritate, 10, 2. His answers to this solution are, however, unconvincing. It is worth considering in detail the position and the criticisms against it. It should be noted that for Avicenna, the active intellect is not a faculty of the individual mind, and that accordingly his position differs from that suggested above. "Avicenna posits that this does not occur (viz. that the mind habitually retains the knowledge of anything which it is not actually considering), on the basis that certain species are conserved in the intellectual part of the soul; but he decides that species not actually being considered cannot be conserved except in the sensitive part, either in the imagination, which is the thesaurus of forms received from sense; or in the memory, which deals with particular intentions not received from sense. But in the intellect, the species does not remain, except when it is actually being considered; but after consideration, it ceases to exist in it actually. Hence, whenever one wishes to consider anything again, the species must flow into the intellect anew from the active intellect. [This corresponds in the above account, to the statement that on each occasion the active intellect must abstract anew from the phantasms.] And yet it does not follow that, if anyone needs to consider anew what he has previously known, he must learn again or investigate from the beginning,

for there has remained in him a certain facility by means of which he can more easily turn himself to the active intellect, so as to receive from it the outflowing species [*i.e.*, as above, there is retained a facility for abstracting]; and this facility is the retention (or habit) of science in us. And according to this opinion there is no memory in the mind in the sense of the retention of any species, but (only) in the sense of a facility for acquiring them anew."

Against this position Aquinas urges the following: "But this opinion does not seem rational. First; because, since the possible intellect is of a more stable nature than sense, it is necessary that the species be received in it in a more stable manner; hence, the species are more able to be conserved in it than in the sensitive part."[44] But what is meant by a *stable nature?* Retentive? But that is just the point to be proven; viz., that the intellect is retentive of the species. Or does it mean less easily affected? But what bearing would this have on the question of retention? If any, surely the reverse of the needs of the argument; for, those who learn easiest, remember best. This argument then is either irrelevant, or a begging of the question. "Secondly, because the active intelligence is equally related to cause the nflux of species pertaining to any and all sciences. Hence, if some species are not conserved in the intellect, but there is conserved only a facility for being turned to the active intellect, man would remain equally facile for any and every intelligible; and thus from having learned one science, he would not know it (permanently) more than other sciences." But the possible intellect is equally receptive of all forms; and greater facility for thought as such *is* the result of any intellectual training. That this facility seems to center especially on the particular science studied, is adequately accounted for by the retention in the sense-memory of the phantasmata, which on Aquinas' own showing, are the potential intelligibles and are necessary for all thinking. The argument fails to prove the necessity of the possible intellect as the *locus specierum*. "Finally, this seems to be expressly contrary to the opinion of the Philosopher in the third book of the De Anima, where he praises his predecessors in that they had posited that the mind is the locus of species in

respect to its intellectual part." That Aristotle should have so taught is indeed an argument for considering, but not for accepting, this position. In the present instance, this is of course an argumentum ad hominem, since Avicenna presumes to be expounding Aristotle.

We conclude then that Aquinas has completely failed to establish the necessity of considering the possible intellect as a *locus specierum*, in the sense he has given to the term, viz., as retaining the species in a state between potentiality and actuality. We may indeed retain the phrase, but only in a sense which makes it synonymous with "receptive of the forms".

As a matter of fact, however, it seems that Thomas himself had doubts on this position, for he frequently qualifies his statements, and in one passage at least, leaves undecided whether the *intellectus in habitu* should be considered as a *locus specierum*, or as an *habilitatio*. "Every intellect in the state of 'habit' understands by means of certain species; for 'habit' is either a certain facility for receiving the intelligible species, by which it is made actually understanding, or it is an ordered aggregate of these species themselves existing in the intellect, not in the state of complete actuality, but midway between potentiality and actuality."[45] The first of these seems more tenable than the second.

The second problem mentioned above is still more difficult of solution: How are the acts of intellect individuated? The soul itself, and hence intellect, is individuated as is any other form, viz., by the matter in which it inheres (or better, by the matter of which it is the form). Hence, the body; or, in the case of the "separated" soul, an enduring *habitus ad corpus* individuates.[46]

Bodies, being material, are individuated by their "materia signata". For the material individual is such because it is determined in respect to a certain time and place, which resolves itself ultimately into a quantitative determination. Consequently "materia signata" is matter determined in respect to quantity, and this is the *principium individuationis*. Anything then which falls under the term "particular", does so through its matter; but it is sensed as particular through the quantitative conditions which inhere in the matter.

Just as our concept of space is derived from the quantita ive

aspects of sense experience, so, I take it, our concept of time is derived from inner experience. "It is impossible that there be one act only of the intellect when it considers several things successively. For, since the operations differ in accordance with their objects, it will follow that the operation of the intellect by which it considers the first object differs from that by which it considers the second." "Every intellect which understands one thing after another, at times understands potentially and at times actually. For while it actually understands the first, it understands the second potentially." "Succession cannot be understood apart from time, nor time apart from motion; since time is the measure of motion in respect to prior and posterior."[47] In a sense then the discreteness and succession of the acts of the mind precede time, for these are among the data from which the concept of time is developed. But in the same way the particularity of things precedes and is the subject of the quantitative accidents; and yet it is not inaccurate to call the latter the principle of individuation. In the same sense then time can be said to be the individuating principle of the acts of the intellect. Actual time is indeed only the succession of discrete instants.[48]

Another approach to the problem is given in the discussion of the individuation of the intellectual soul. "An act can be numerically differentiated only in two ways: either from the point of view of the object, or from the point of view of the acting principle; to which, however, can be added a third: from the point of view of time, as when some act receives an interruption of time. Therefore, the act of understanding, which is the function of the possible intellect, can be differentiated according to its objects, as it is one thing to think 'man' and another to think 'horse'; and also according to time, as it is one act numerically which took place yesterday, and another which takes place today, if the operation be discontinuous."[49] It seems entirely possible then on this basis to reduce the discreteness of the acts of the same intellect to the number of its objects, and ultimately to the distinction of the phantasmata from which abstraction proceeds. These, as material, are in the last analysis individuated as above. Hence by the individuation of the object, the act is individuated; and this even though in another

sense the object of the intellect is the universal for it is rather *a* universal. That is, the mind can have but one object of consideration at a time.[50]

We may conclude therefore, that though the particular acts of the mind necessarily differ in time, the unity of the object—as one species or universal or concept—must also be taken into account. Yet, since I can think of the same object today, that I thought of yesterday; and nevertheless these are two acts though one object; time seems to remain the fundamental principle.

Of the functions of the intellect there remains for consideration how the intellect knows itself. Is this a direct or an indirect knowledge? "The human intellect is situated in the genus of intelligible things as potential existent only, just as prime matter is in the genus of sensibles; hence it is called 'possible'. Thus, therefore, considered in its essence, it exists as potentially understanding. Hence, of its own nature it has the power of understanding, but not of being understood, except in so far as it becomes actual. . . But since it is natural to our intellect according to the status of this present life to consider material and sensible things, it follows that it understands itself in so far as it is made actual by the species abstracted from sensibles by the light of the active intellect, which is the actuality of the intelligibles themselves; and by means of these the possible intellect understands. Therefore, our intellect does not know itself through its essence, but through its activity. And this in a twofold way: one in a particular manner, by which Socrates or Plato perceives that he has an intellectual soul by the fact that he perceives that he understands. The other in a universal manner, by which we consider the nature of the human mind from the activity of the intellect. . . But there is a difference between these two cognitions. For the first cognition concerning the mind, there suffices the presence itself of the mind, which is the principle of its activity, on the grounds of which the mind perceives itself; and therefore, it is said to know itself through its own presence. But for the second cognition concerning the mind, its presence does not suffice, but there is required a diligent and subtle analysis." "The human intellect

is not its own act of understanding, nor is its essence itself the prime object of its act, but rather this is something external to itself, namely the nature of a material thing. And therefore, that which is primarily known by the human intellect is an object of this sort; and secondarily there is known its own activity by which the object is known; through its activity the intellect itself is known, whose perfection is its act of understanding."[51] Yet in a sense the knowledge of the essence of the soul seems to be a presupposition, or to be prior to, the abstractive knowledge of external nature: "Our intellect is not able to understand anything before it abstracts from the phantasms; nor is it able to have even an habitual knowledge of other things from itself, namely those things which are not in it itself, before the above-mentioned abstraction, since the species of other intelligibles are not innate to it; but its own essence is innate to it, so that it does not necessarily have to acquire this from the phantasms; just as the essence of matter is not acquired from the natural agent, but only its form, which is related to the natural matter as the intelligible form is related to sensible matter. And therefore, the mind, before it abstracts from the phantasms, has an habitual knowledge of itself, by which it can perceive that it exists."

An habitual knowledge, however, needs to be actualized. How can this occur except by the activity of the intellect itself, which necessarily involves the process of abstraction?[52]

Thus, any adequate knowledge of the nature and essence of the intellect is gained only through careful analysis of its functions and activities. It is the result of reflection and inference, not an intuition. From such analysis we are forced to conclude that the outstanding note of these activities is their immateriality. This is established by the nature of the concepts themselves, for they are abstracted from all material conditions. Now for the mind to receive all concepts or forms, it must itself be in its own nature without them; since it deals with the immaterial it must itself be immaterial. Hence, it is without any proper bodily organ: it is "separated", in the terminology of Aristotle.[53]

The active intellect as well must be separated in this sense of not being the function of any bodily organ. Is it also separated in the sense of not being an intrinsic faculty of the individual soul, but rather one for all men? It seems indeed to carry us beyond the individual, even perhaps to God Himself, for it is the "light of the active reason" which makes all things known that are known.

III

The Unity of the Active Intellect

On this problem of the unity of the active intellect, much speculation has been expended whenever the problems bequeathed by the obscurities of Aristotle have engaged men's minds. We shall find the solution here offered complex: the active intellect is indeed a part of the individual soul; nevertheless, in the final analysis the light of the active intellect is a sharing in the divine reason. "We say that the light of the active intellect, concerning which Aristotle speaks, is immediately imprinted on us by God, by which we discern the true from the false, and the good from the evil. . . .Thus, therefore, that which establishes in us the actual intelligibles after the manner of a participated light, is a part of the soul, and is individuated according to the number of souls and of men. But that which establishes the intelligibles after the manner of the illuminating sun, is one being, separated from the soul, and this is God."[54]

In the first place, the active intellect, just as the possible, must be a faculty of the individual soul. In the case of the latter the proposition is more easily established: the possible intellect is that by which one knows; but if it were not individuated, but one for all, then whatever *one* knew, *all* must know, and thus there could be no differences of intellectual attainment: a result which is patently absurd. Furthermore, it is the intellectual soul which is the form of man; but the form is individuated by its matter (the body), hence, also the intellect. Finally, were the possible intellect one only for all men, it would be impossible to establish any but a fortuitous connection between the intellect and the sense faculties; but this runs counter to experience.

Now we have already seen that the active intellect as well as the possible is needed to account for the operations of reason. But just because it is only by the functioning of the active intellect that we actually think; so since we are not always thinking, the active intellect must be a function of the individual soul.

For if separated in the sense of one intellect for all men, it must know *per essentiam suam;* hence, it must always know, and not intermittently as is actually the case in human experience.[55] We have seen above how this activity may be impeded provided the active reason be a function of the individual mind, and hence, essentially related to the sense faculties. Were it a separate substance (as it must be if it is one for all men), these conditions would no longer restrict its activity, for, it could not be dependent on the organism, but must act through its own essence; hence, we should be always thinking.

It must also be true, however, in this as in any other series in which the potential becomes actual, that as the final ground of the whole process there must exist the perfect and pure actuality. This in the case of thought, is the active intellect as "separated" or existing by and through itself; it is then God. Here "active" and "actual" are no longer differentiated. Hence, derivatively we think through the light of the active reason which is God; immediately through the light of the active reason which is a function of the individual soul.

So also if we consider that activity of the active reason which is the knowledge of first principles, we are driven back to one ultimate source and ground to account for the fact that these principles are the same for all men. It does not follow, however, that all men directly know through the same active intellect.[56]

The relation is analogous to that which obtains in other fields, for example, in generation. Here the principle or source of generation is the sun; but this does not do away with the necessity of a separate and individual faculty of generation in men; rather it demands such a faculty. So also then with reason; both the single first principle, and the individual faculty of active intellect are required.

IV

The Presuppositions of the Act of Knowing

It is the entire man who knows. This seemingly simple statement must never be forgotten in the discussion of the various faculties, which, although distinguishable, and even, from certain points of view, belonging to different orders of being, (corporeal and spiritual), nevertheless are not separable. The close relation of sense and intellect has already been emphasized: sense and sense-imagery enter into every act of the intellect. It is through this intimate and necessary relationship that intellect deals with reality. Man then is not, as the Platonists taught, a soul or pure spirit using the body; he is rather an organic unity, a composite of which the soul is but the form. Hence, sense is the foundation and accompaniment of all thought. Yet thought is not merely a more elaborate kind of sensation; it is *sui generis:* thought can be explained only in terms of thought. It deals with that same reality that sense is conversant with; but it deals with it after a different manner: by abstracting from the material and individuating conditions in which sense remains enmeshed. What is potential only in sense-apprehension, becomes actual, explicit, in intellectual knowledge: the universals, the ideas of the intelligible world. Yet this Platonic phrase does not commit to Platonic doctrine; this intelligible world as such exists only in the mind. And it is just because the ideas are not actually intelligible and universal apart from the mind, that we are compelled to distinguish in the mind itself two functions (clearly enough not two minds): the one, the capacity to receive; the other, the capacity to form, the intelligibles from the potential matter of sensation and imagery. Were the ideas actually existing in some ideal world, there would be no more necessity for an active intellect, than there is for an active sense-faculty. This doctrine is accordingly Aristotelian, and not Platonic.

The problem of knowing then is to show how it is possible for the mind to "become all things". We find first of all the three

requirements just enumerated: the sense-faculties which immediately apprehend the external world, giving the sensible forms; the possible intellect, which is the faculty of thought, or the "capacity of becoming all things"; and the active intellect, which is the faculty of making the potential forms (or images) actually intelligible.

But does not this activity itself have other presuppositions? In a sense, yes. There are presupposed the first principles of all knowledge. We must utilize here another Aristotelian distinction: that between the most knowable in an absolute sense, or in nature; and the most knowable for us. The first principles are the "most knowable" in the former sense; the deliverances of sense, in the latter. But if first principles are most knowable only in the absolute sense, they would seem to be the least (and perhaps, the last) knowable in respect to our apprehension and growth in knowledge. How then can they be considered "presuppositions" of the act of knowing? And yet it is by them that the active intellect makes other things known. The answer, I think, lies in the carrying out of the distinction drawn: ontologically, the more knowable in the absolute sense is prior to, or presupposed by, the less knowable (which is in this case more knowable for us). But in the mind of God the more knowable in the absolute sense would also be the first knowable (if one may use such a phrase in respect to God). They are presupposed indeed to account for existence; they are then presupposed for the act of knowing as prior to that act; but they are not, by the individual, known first; but are themselves *as knowledge* the result of the very process of abstraction which could not take place unless, in the ontological sphere, they were prior.

This presupposition really turns out to be the presupposition of the mind of God (or simply God, as pure intellect; the use of the phrase "mind of God", carries no other implications); and this we have already seen to be necessary to account for the functioning of the active intellect. It was there established by another line of argument: the familiar metaphysical argument which applies to all becoming. For the intellect, as possible, undergoes a passage from potentiality to actuality (or actualization). But every such process demands as its source or ground

pure actuality; but this is, in the intellectual sphere, God. Hence, the very fact that the human intellect is actualized (immediately indeed by the individual faculty of active intellect) presupposes the existence of the completely actualized, the perfect, which never passes from potentiality to actuality. Clearly enough, then, the mind of God is a presupposition of the act of knowing of the mind of man. Otherwise phrased, the light of the active intellect is an emanation from, or a sharing of, the light of pure reason, which is God. And it is because of this that the first principles by which the active intellect functions are the same for all men.

Hence, we may readily agree that in order for there to be one (human) mind, there must be two minds, of which one is the mind of God. And we may agree also that there are presupposed principles or "categories" in order that man may learn or may know; but again these are not presupposed as possessions of his mind, but rather of the mind of God. Whatever these first principles or "categories" turn out to be—and nowhere does either Aristotle or St. Thomas offer an exhaustive enumeration of them—as *knowledge* they are acquired just as is any other knowledge: by abstraction from sense experience. One can only say then that there is presupposed in the mind of man the capacity to learn; and since learning itself is twofold in nature, so also is the faculty: one receptive, or the possible intellect: the other formative, or the active intellect.

V

The Goal of Intellectual Activity

We have already seen that the intellect is the highest, and therefore the defining, activity of man; and that this activity is ultimately grounded in God. As with function, so with the object of the faculty; for the object determines the activity. Now the object of intellect is the essence of things; that is, a knowledge of reality as it is in itself, and through its causes. Or otherwise, the object of intellect is truth; but this latter most strictly applies to the subjective aspects, and only derivatively to the external reality; for truth pertains to judgments, and then to that which is judged as justifying the judgment made.[57]

We have already discussed the process—abstractive and intuitive,—by which the intellect gains its insight into reality; and also the process of ratiocination by which as well it proceeds to new truths.

Now the intellect is that which can "become all things"; for all reality is the object of its knowledge; but in the act of knowing, the knower and the known are one (intellectus in actu est intellectum in actu). But for a discursive intellect, such as ours, to know all things requires an infinite progress in knowledge; for to know all things by one immediate act is beyond human powers, and applies properly to God alone.[58]

Hence, if the human mind is to know all things, it must have an infinite time in which to accomplish its task. Now "nature and God do nothing in vain," that is, there is no function or faculty without its object or fulfillment. (That is, there must be real possibility of fulfillment; not that everyone must attain it.) Hence, the intellect must endure beyond the finite span of its connection with the body. In other words, the very nature of the intellect demands that it be immortal. It is, however, a function of the soul which is itself the form of the body; how then can it survive the destruction of that organism which is its matter?

It is true that the intellect is a faculty of the soul; it functions,

however, without any bodily organ; it operates therefore *per se ipsum;* and is then "substantia subsistens in suo esse"; hence, incorruptible.[59] It remains individuated, as we have seen, by an abiding *habitus ad corpus.* Furthermore, the very perfection of the mind's operation lies in its abstraction and separation from matter; its destruction cannot also lie in the same qualities: for perfection and destruction are contraries. Hence, viewed from every angle, the nature of the mind shows its immortality.

But how can the soul continue to function apart from the body, since the earlier analysis has shown that the sense-faculties are necessary even for intellectual activity? The question, it must be noted, is not *whether,* but *how.* That it has intellectual activity follows from the proof of its immortality. For intellect is the highest function of the soul, so that, if it lacks that, it will certainly lack any other function. But if it lacks all functions whatsoever, it is impossible that it exist apart from the body. It does, however, so exist; ergo.

It is true that for the perfection of knowledge, and particularly for the knowledge which includes singulars, union with the body is necessary. The separated soul, then, apart from supernatural aid, can have only an imperfect knowledge, derived from two sources: from the influx of forms from the spiritual substances which are superior to it; and from the intelligible species conserved in the intellectual memory. In regard to the former, this is similar, though weaker and less adequate, to the manner in which angels, or the separated substances, know. For the soul is the lowest in the order of intellectual substances. Now the higher the being in that order, the fewer the forms or ideas required for perfect knowledge; until we reach God, who knows all things perfectly through one form, viz., his own essence.[60]

We are led to similar conclusions, if we consider the other intellectual faculty, will. This seeks the universal good, as intellect seeks the universal truth. In this aspect, however, we have seen that will is dependent on intellect. One can rationally seek only that good which is known: hence the good and the true are ultimately one.

Now man's perfection or happiness consists in the attainment of perfect good and truth, but this in the final analysis is the

vision of God, who is this goodness and truth. "Beatitude designates the acquisition of perfect good. Whoever therefore, is capable of perfect good, can attain to beatitude. But that man is capable of perfect good, is clear from the fact that his intellect can comprehend universal and perfect good, and his will can desire it; and therefore, man is capable of attaining beatitude. The same conclusion is clear also from the fact that man is capable of the vision of the divine essence, in which vision indeed we have said that perfect beatitude for man consists." "Perfect beatitude cannot consist essentially in the consideration of speculative sciences. This is made clear by the fact that the consideration of a speculative science cannot extend beyond the force of the principles of that science, for in the principles of the science is virtually contained the whole science. But the first principles of the speculative sciences are derived from sense. . . . Hence, it follows that the final beatitude of man cannot lie in the consideration of the speculative sciences. But as in sensible forms a certain likeness of superior substances is to be found, so the consideration of the speculative sciences is a certain participation of the true and perfect beatitude." "Final and perfect beatitude can lie in nothing except in the vision of the divine essence. . . Man is not perfectly blessed while there remains for him something to be desired and sought. . . If therefore, the human intellect, knowing the essence of any created effect, knows nothing concerning God except whether He is, its perfection has not yet reached absolutely its first cause, but there remains for it a natural desire to seek the cause; hence, it is not yet perfectly blessed. For perfect beatitude, therefore, it is necessary that the intellect attain to the very essence of the first cause. And accordingly it has its perfection through union with God as with its object, in which alone the beatitude of man consists."[61]

"Fecisti nos, Domine, ad Te, et inquietum est cor
nostrum donec requiescat in Te."

NOTES

1. Si ponamus animam corpori uniri sicut formam, omnino impossibile videtur plures animas per essentiam differentes in uno corpore esse. Quod quidem triplici ratione manifestari potest. Primo quidem quia animal non esset simpliciter unum, cujus essent animae plures; nihil enim est simpliciter unum nisi per formam unam, per quam habet res esse; ab eodem enim habet res quod sit ens, et quod sit una; et ideo ea quae denominantur a diversis formis, non sunt unum simpliciter, sicut homo albus. Si igitur homo ab alia forma haberet quod sit vivum, scilicet ab anima vegetabili, et ab alia forma quod sit animal, scilicet ab anima sensibili, et ab alia forma quod sit homo, scilicet ab anima rationali; sequeretur quod homo non esset unum simpliciter. . . . Secundo, hoc apparet impossibile ex modo praedicationis. Quae enim sumuntur a diversis formis, praedicantur ad invicem: vel per accidens, si formae non sint ad invicem ordinatae, puta cum dicimus, quod album est dulce; vel si formae sint ordinatae ad invicem, erit praedicatio per se in secundo modo dicendi per se; quia subjectum ponitur in definitione praedicati, sicut superficies praeambula est ad colorem. . . Si ergo alia forma sit a qua aliquid dicitur animal, et a qua aliquid dicitur homo; sequetur quod vel unum horum non possit praedicari de altero nisi per accidens, si istae duae formae ad invicem ordinem non habent, vel quod sit ibi praedicatio in secundo modo dicendi per se, si una animarum sit ad aliam praeambula. Utrumque autem horum est manifeste falsum, quia animal per se de homine praedicatur, non per accidens; homo autem non ponitur in definitione animalis, sed e converso. Ergo oportet eamdem formam esse per quam aliquid est animal, et per quam aliquid est homo; alioquin homo non vere esset id quod est animal, ut sic animal per se de homine praedicetur. Tertio, apparet hoc esse impossibile per hoc quod una operatio animae, cum fuerit intensa, impedit aliam; quod nullo modo contingeret, nisi principium actionum est per essentiam unam. Sic ergo dicendum quod eadem numero est anima in homine, sensitiva et intellectiva et nutritiva. (S. Th. 1. 76. 3c.)

2. Anima rationalis dat corpori humano quidquid dat anima sensibilis brutis, vegetabilis plantis, et ulterius aliquid; et propter hoc ipsa est in homine et vegetabilis et sensibilis et rationalis. (De An. 11. Resp.) Sic cum anima sit forma substantialis, quia constituit hominem in determinata specie substantiae, non est aliqua alia forma substantialis media inter animam et materiam primam; sed homo ab ipsa anima rationali perficitur secundum diversos gradus perfectionum, ut sit scilicet, corpus, et animatum corpus, et animal rationale. (De An. 9. Resp.)

3. Potentia nihil aliud est quam principium operationis alicujus, sive sit actio sive passio; non quidem principium quod est subjectum agens aut patiens; sed id quo agens agit aut patiens patitur. (De An. 12.)

4. Manifestum est quod potentiae animae, sive sint activae sive passivae, non dicuntur directe per respectum ad aliquid substantiale, sed ad aliquid accidentale; et similiter esse intelligens vel sentiens actu, non est esse substantiale, sed accidentale, ad quod ordinatur intellectus et sensus; et similiter esse magnum vel parvum, ad quod ordinatur vis augmentativa. Generativa vero potentia et nutritiva ordinantur quidem ad substantiam producendam vel conservandam, sed per transmutationem materiae; unde talis actio, sicut et aliorum agentium naturalium, fit a substantia mediante principio accidentali. Manifestum est ergo quod ipsa essentia animae non est principium immediatum suarum operationum; sed operatur mediantibus principiis accidentalibus; unde potentiae animae non sunt ipsa essentia animae, sed proprietates ejus. Deinde hoc apparet ex ipsa diversitate actionum animae, quae sunt genere diversae, et non sunt reduci ad unum principium immediatum. . . Et ita, cum essentia animae sit unum principium, non potest esse immediatum principium omnium suarum actionum. (De An. 12, Resp.)

5. Potentiae animae non sunt partes essentiales animae quasi constituentes essentiam ejus; sed partes potentiales, quia virtus animae distinguitur per hujusmodi potentias. (De An. 12, ad15m.)

6. Ad perfectam sensus cognitionem, quae sufficiat animali, quinque requiruntur. Primo quod sensus recipiat speciem a sensibilibus; et hoc pertinet ad sensum proprium. Secundo quod de sensibilibus perceptis dijudicet, et ea ad invicem discernat: quod oportet fieri per potentiam ad quam omnia sensibilia perveniunt, quae dicitur sensus communis. Tertium est quod species sensi*bili*um receptae conserventur. Indiget autem animal apprehensione sensibilium non solum ad eorum praesentiam, sed etiam postquam abierint: et hoc necessarium est reduci in aliquam potentiam. Nam et in rebus corporalibus aliud principium est recipiendi, et aliud conservandi, nam quae sunt bene receptibilia, sunt interdum male conservativa. Hujusmodi autem potentia dicitur imaginatio sive phantasia. Quarto autem requiruntur intentiones aliquae quas sensus non apprehendit, sicut nocivum et utile et alia hujusmodi. Et ad haec quidem cognoscenda pervenit homo inquirendo et conferendo; alia vero animalia quodam naturali instinctu, sicut ovis naturaliter fugit lupum tanquam nocivum; unde ad hoc in aliis animalibus ordinatur aestimativa naturalis; in homine autem vis cogitativa, quae est collativa intentionum particularium: unde et ratio particularis dicitur, et intellectus passivus. Quinto autem requiritur quod ea quae prius fuerunt apprehensa per sensus, et interius conservata iterum ad actualem considerationem revocentur. Et hoc quidem pertinet ad rememorativam virtutem: quae in aliis quidem animalibus absque inquisitione suam operationem habet, in hominibus autem cum inquisitione et studio; unde in hominibus non solum est memoria,

sed reminiscentia. . . Cognitio autem intellectus requirit duas potentias; scilicet intellectum agentem et possibilem. (De An 13, Resp.) Cum autem operans oporteat aliquo modo conjungi, suo objecto, circa quod operatur; necesse est extrinsecam rem, quae est objectum operationis animae secundum duplicem rationem ad animam comparari. Uno modo secundum quod nata est animae conjungi, et in anima esse per suam similitudinem; et quantum ad hoc sunt duo genera potentiarum, scilicet, *sensitivum* respectu objecti minus communis, quod est corpus sensibile; et *intellectivum* respectu objecti communisissimi, quod est ens universale. Alio vero modo secundum quod ipsa anima inclinatur et tendit in rem exteriorem. Et secundum hanc etiam comparationem sunt duo genera potentiarum animae: unum quidem, scilicet appetitivum, secundum quod anima comparatur ad rem extrinsecam et ad finem, qui est primum in intentione; aliud autem *motivum secundum locum*, prout anima comparatur ad rem exteriorem sicut ad terminum operationis et motus. Ad consequendum enim aliquod desideratum et intentum omne animal movetur. (S. Th. 1. 78. 1c.)

7. Cum enim maxima sit distantia inter esse intelligibile et esse materiale et sensibile, non statim forma rei materialis ab intellectu accipitur, sed per multa media ad eum deducitur; puta, forma alicujus sensibilis prius fit in medio, ubi est spiritualior quam in re sensibili; et postmodum in organo sensus; et exinde derivatur ad phantasiam, et ad alias inferiores vires; et ulterius tandem perducitur ad intellectum. . . Intellectus noster cognoscit per species a rebus acceptas, quae sunt abstractae a materia, et omnibus materiae conditionibus; et ideo non potest cognoscere singularia, sed universalia tantum. (De An. 20.)

8. Intellectus animae humanae habet naturam acquirendi cognitionem immaterialem ex cognitione materialium, quae est per sensum. Sic igitur ex operatione animae humanae, modus esse ipsius cognosci potest. In quantum enim habet operationem materialia transcendentem, esse suum est supra corpus elevatum, non dependens ex ipso; in quantum vero immaterialem cognitionem ex materiali est nata acquirere, manifestum est quod complementum suae speciei esse non potest absque corporis unione. . . Ultima perfectio animae humanae consistit in cognitione veritatis, quae est per intellectum. Ad hoc autem quod perficiatur anima in cognitione veritatis, indiget uniri corpori; quia intelligit per phantasmata, quae non sunt sine corpore. (De An. 1, Resp.) Manifestum est etiam quod potentiae sensitivae sunt nobis necessariae ad intelligendum non solum in acquisitione scientiae, sed etiam in utendo scientia jam acquisita. Non enim possumus considerare etiam ea quorum scientiam habemus, nisi convertendo nos ad phantasmata. (De An 15, R.)

9. Cum potentiae animae sunt naturales proprietates speciem consequentes, anima non potest sine his esse. Dato autem quod sine his esset, adhuc tamen anima diceretur secundum speciem suam intellectualis vel rationalis, non quia actu haberet has potentias, sed propter speciem talis essentiae, ex qua natae sunt hujusmodi potentiae effluere. (S. Th. 1. 2. 110, 4 ad 4m.)

10. Alia animalia percipiunt hujusmodi intentiones [*i.e.*, ut utilitas aut inutilitas] solum naturali quodam instinctu, homo autem per quamdam collationem. Et ideo quae in aliis animalibus dicitur *aestimativa naturalis*, in homine dicitur *cogitativa*, quae per collationem quamdam hujusmodi intentiones adinvenit. Unde etiam dicitur *ratio particularis*, cui medici assignat determinatum organum, scilicet mediam partem capitis. Est enim collativa intentionum individualium, sicut *ratio intellectiva* est collativa intentionum universalium. (S. Th. 1. 78. 4, Resp.)

11. Intellectus [autem] habet operationem circa ens in universali. (S. Th. 1. 79.) Impossibile est quod intellectus exerceatur per aliquod organum corporale. (De An 64.)

12. Intellectus practicus et speculativus non sunt diversae potentiae. Cujus ratio est quia id quod accidentaliter se habet ad objecti rationem quam respicit aliqua potentia, non diversificat potentiam. . . Accidit autem alicui apprehenso per intellectum quod ordinetur ad opus, vel non ordinetur. Secundum hoc autem differunt intellectus speculativus, et practicus; nam intellectus speculativus est qui quod apprehendit, non ordinat ad opus, sed ad solam veritatis considerationem; practicus vero intellectus dicitur qui hoc quod apprehendit, ordinat ad opus. (S. Th. 1. 79. 11c.)

13. Verum et bonum se invicem includunt. Nam verum est quoddam bonum, alioquin non esset appetibile; et bonum est quoddam verum, alioquin non esset intelligibile. Sicut igitur objectum appetitus potest esse verum, inquantum habet rationem boni, sicut cum aliquis appetit veritatem cognoscere; ita objectum intellectus practici est bonum ordinabile ad opus sub ratione veri. Intellectus enim practicus veritatem cognoscit, sicut speculativus; sed veritatem cognitam ordinat ad opus. (*Ibid.*, ad 2m.)

14. Appetitus naturalis est inclinatio cujuslibet rei in aliquid ex natura sua. Unde naturali appetitu quaelibet potentia desiderat sibi conveniens. Sed appetitus animalis consequitur formam apprehensam; et ad hujusmodi appetitum requiritur specialis animae potentia, et non sufficit sola apprehensio. (S. Th. 1. 78. 1 ad3m.) Quia igitur est alterius generis apprehensum per intellectum, et apprehensum per sensum, consequens est quod appetitus intellectivus sit alia potentia a sensitivo. (S. Th. 1. 80. 2c.) Ex parte appetitus, velle importat simplicem appetitum alicujus rei; unde voluntas dicitur esse de fine, qui propter se appetitur. (S. Th. 1. 83 4c.) Voluntas appetit naturaliter quod est bonum secundum rationem. (De Ver. 5. ad1m.)

15. Cum omnis inclinatio consequatur aliquam formam, appetitus naturalis consequitur formam in natura existentem; appetitus autem sensitivus, vel etiam intellectivus, seu rationalis, quia dicitur *voluntas*, sequitur formam apprehensam. (S. Th. 1. 2. 8. 1c.) Intellectus movet voluntatem, quia bonum intellectum est objectum voluntatis, et movet ipsam ut finis. (S. Th. 1. 82. 4c.) Primum principium formale est ens et verum universale, quod est objectum intellectus, et ideo isto modo motionis intellectus movet voluntatem, sicut praesentans ei objectum suum. (S. Th. 1. 2. 9. 1c.) Bonum autem in communi, quod habet rationem finis, est objectum voluntatis; et ideo ex hoc parte voluntas movet alias potentias animae ad suos actus. (*Ibid*) Dicitur aliquid movere per modum agentis, sicut alterans movet alteratum, et impellens movet impulsum; et hoc modo voluntas movet intellectum. (S. Th. 1. 82 4c.)

16. Intellectus possibilis non movetur nisi a duobus: scilicet a proprio objecto, quod est forma intelligibilis, scilicet quod quid est, et a voluntate, quae movet omnes alias vires. . . Quandoque vero intellectus non potest determinari ad alteram partem contradictionis neque statim per ipsas definitiones terminorum, sicut in principiis, nec etiam virtute principiorum, sicut in conclusionibus demonstrativis est; determinatur autem per voluntatem, quae eligit assentire uni parti determinate et praecise propter aliquid, quod est sufficiens ad movendum voluntatem, non autem ad movendum intellectum, utpote quod videtur bonum vel conveniens huic parti assentire; et ista est dispositio credentis, ut cum aliquis credit dictis alicujus hominis, quia videtur decens vel utile. (*loc. cit.*) For the understanding of the first method, namely that the intelligible forms move the intellect, instead of the more usual statement that it is the active intellect which makes the form intelligible, one should compare the following: In receptione qua intellectus possibilis species rerum accipit a phantasmatibus, se habent phantasmata ut agens instrumentale et secundarium; intellectus vero agens ut agens principale et primum; et ideo actionis effectus relinquitur in intellectu possibili secundum conditionem utriusque, et non secundum conditionem alterius tantum; et ideo intellectus possibilis recipit formas ut intelligibiles actu, ex virtute intellectus agentis, sed ut similitudines determinatarum rerum ex cognitione phantasmatum; et sic formae intelligibiles in actu non sunt per se existentes neque in phantasia, neque in intellectu agente, sed solum in intellectu possibili. (De Ver. 10.6.ad7m.)

17. Id quod intelligitur non est in intellectu secundum se, sed secundum suam similitudinem; lapis enim non est in anima, sed species lapidis. Et tamen lapis est id quod intelligitur, non autem species lapidis, nisi per reflexionem intellectus supra seipsum; alioquin scientiae non essent de rebus, sed de speciebus intelligibilibus. (S. Th. 1. 76. 2. ad4m.) Sed hoc tamen interest inter sensum et intellectum, quia res sentitur secundum illam dispositionem

quam extra animam habet in sua particularitate; natura autem rei quae intelligitur, est quidem extra animam, sed non habet illum modum essendi extra animam secundum quem intelligitur. Intelligitur enim natura communis, seclusis principiis individuantibus; non autem hunc modum essendi habet extra animam. (*Ibid*) And again, Si ea quae intelligimus essent solum species quae sunt in anima, sequeretur quod scientiae omnes non essent de rebus quae sunt extra animam, sed solum de speciebus intelligibilibus, quae sunt in anima . . . Et ideo dicendum est quod species intelligibilis se habet ad intellectum ut id quo intelligit intellectus . . . Sed quia intellectus supra seipsum reflectitur, secundum eamdem reflexionem intelligit et suum intelligere, et speciem qua intelligit. Et sic species intellecta secundario est id quod intelligitur; sed id quod intelligitur primo, est res cujus species intelligibilis est similitudo. (S. Th. 1. 85. 2c.) This seems to commit Aquinas to a defense of the intellectual knowledge of the particular; this however, is only indirectly known. Intellectus noster directe non est cognoscitivus nisi universalium. Indirecte autem et quasi per quamdam reflexionem, potest cognoscere singulare. . . Singulare non repugnat intelligi, inquantum est singulare, sed inquantum est materiale. (S. Th. 1. 86. 1c., et ad 3m.)

18. Sicut enim forma universalis ducit in cognitionem materiae universalis, ita forma individualis ducit in cognitionem materiae signatae, quae est individuationis principium. (De Ver. 10. 5c.)

19. Mens per accidens singularibus se immiscet, inquantum continuatur viribus sensitivis, quae circa particularia versantur. Quae quidem continuatio est dupliciter. Uno modo inquantum motus sensitivae partis terminatur ad mentem, sicut accidit in motu qui est a rebus ad animam; et sic mens singulare cognoscit per quamdam reflexionem, prout, scilicet mens cognoscendo objectum suum, quod est aliqua natura universalis, redit in cognitionem sui actus, et ulterius in speciem quae est actus sui principium, et ulterius in phantasmata a quo species est abstracta; et sic aliquam cognitionem de singulari accipit. [*loc. cit.*]

20. Utrum homo docere alium possit et dici magister, vel Deus solus. The eleventh objection reads: Scientia nihil aliud est quam descriptio rerum in anima, cum scientia esse dicitur assimilatio scientis ad scitum. Sed unus homo non potest in alterius anima describere rerum similitudines: sic enim interius operatur in ipso; quod solius Dei est. Ergo unus homo alium docere non potest. In reply: Ad undecimum dicendum, quod in discipulo describuntur formae intelligibiles ex quibus scientia per doctrinam accepta constituitur, immediate quidem per intellectum agentem, sed mediate per eum qui docet. Proponit enim doctor rerum intelligibilium signa, ex quibus intellectus agens accipit intentiones intelligibiles, et describit eas in intellectu possibili; unde ipsa verba doctoris audita, vel visa in scripta, hoc modo se habent ad causan-

dum scientiam in intellectu sicut res quae sunt extra animam, quia ex utrisque intellectus intentiones intelligibiles accipit; quamvis verba doctoris propinquius se habeant ad causandum scientiam quam sensibilia extra animam existentia, inquantum sunt signa intelligibilium intentionum. [*loc. cit.*]

21. Si intellectus agens compararetur ad intellectum possibilem, ut objectum agens ad potentiam, sicut visibile in actu ad visum; sequeretur quod statim omnia intelligeremus, cum intellectus agens sit quo est omnia facere. Nunc autem non se habet ut objectum, sed ut faciens objecta in actu; ad quod requiritur praeter praesentiam intellectus agentis praesentia phantasmatum, et bona dispositio virium sensitivarum, et exercitium in hujusmodi opere; quia per unum intellectum fiunt alia intellecta, sicut per terminos, propositiones, et per prima principia, conclusiones. (S. Th. 1.79.4 ad 3m.)

22. Quia phantasmata non sufficiunt immutare intellectum possibilem, sed oportet quod fiant intelligibilia actu per intellectum agentem, non potest dici quod sensibilis cognitio sit totalis et perfecta causa intellectualis cognitionis, sed magis quodammodo est materia causae. (S. Th. 1.84.6c.)

23. Illi enim im quibus virtus imaginativa et cogitativa et memorativa est melius disposita, sunt melius dispositi ad intelligendum. (S. Th. 1.85.7c.)

24. In operatione animae humanae duplex compositio invenitur; una qua componit et dividit praedicatum cum subjecto, formando propositiones: alia qua componit principia cum conclusionibus conferendo. Sed in prima compositione eadem potentia animae est quae ipsa simplicia apprehendit, id est praedicatum et subjectum, per proprias quidditates; et quae componendo propositionem format; utrumque enim intellectui possibili attribuitur. Ergo et similiter una potentia erit quae ipsa principia accipit, quod est intellectus, et principia in conclusiones ordinat, quod est rationis. To the last distinction between "intuitive" and "discursive" reason—we shall return later.

25. Inconvenienter dicitur intellectus agens nudus vel vestitus; plenus speciebus vel vacuus. Impleri enim speciebus est intellectus possibilis; sed facere eas est intellectus agentis. Non est autem dicendum quod intellectus agens seorsum intelligat ab intellectu possibili: sed homo intelligit per utrumque. (De Sp. Cr. 10 ad 15m.)

26. Quandoque enim ponunt quatuor intellectus, scilicet intellectum agentum, possibilem, et in habitu, et adeptum; quorum quatuor intellectus agens et possibilis sunt diversae potentiae, sicut et in omnibus est alia potentia activa et alia passiva; alia vero tria distinguuntur secundum tres status intellectus possibilis; qui quandoque est in potentia tantum, et sic dicitur possibilis; quandoque autem in actu primo, qui est scientia, et sic dicitur intellectus in habitu; quandoque autem in actu secundo qui est considerare; et sic dicitur intellectus in actu, sive intellectus adeptus. (S. Th. 1.79.10c.) This last term is the Averroistic acquired intellect.

27. Virtus intellectualis speculativa est per quam intellectus speculativus perficitur ad considerandum verum; hoc enim est bonum opus ejus. Verum autem est dupliciter considerabile: uno modo, sicut per se notum; alio modo, sicut per aliud notum. Quod autem est per se notum, se habet ut principium, et percipitur statim ab intellectu; et ideo habitus perficiens intellectum ad hujusmodi veri considerationem vocatur intellectus qui est habitus principiorum. Verum autem quod est per aliud notum, non statim percipitur ab intellectu, sed per inquisitionem rationis; et se habet in ratione termini. Quod quidem potest esse dupliciter: uno modo, ut sit ultimum in aliquo genere; alio modo, ut sit ultimum respectu totius cognitionis humanae. Et quia "ea quae sunt posterius nota quoad nos, sunt priora, et magis nota secundum naturam," ideo id quod est ultimum respectu totius cognitionis humanae, est id quod est primum et maxime cognoscibile secundum naturam. Et circa hujusmodi est sapientia, quae "considerat altissimas causas," unde convenienter judicat et ordinat de omnibus, quia judicium perfectum et universale haberi non potest nisi per resolutionem ad primas causas. Ad id vero quod est ultimum in hoc vel in illo genere cognoscibilium, perficit intellectum scientia; et ideo secundum diversa genera scibilium sunt diversi habitus scientiarum, cum tamen sapientia non sit nisi una. (S. Th. 1.2.57.2c.)

28. Quidam vero crediderunt, intellectum agentem non esse aliud quam habitum principiorum indemonstrabilium in nobis. Sed hoc esse non potest, quia etiam ipsa principia indemonstrabilia cognoscimus abstrahendo a singularibus. Unde oportet praeexistere intellectum agentem habitui principiorum sicut causam ipsius; ipsa vero principia comparantur ad intellectum agentem ut instrumenta quaedam ejus, quia per ea, facit alia intelligibilia actu. (De An. 5c, ad finem.)

29. Omnis nostra cognitio originaliter consistit in notitia primorum principiorum indemonstrabilium. Horum autem cognitio in nobis a sensu oritur. (De Ver. 10.6. Sed contra 2.)

30. Potest enim aliquid dici per se notum dupliciter: vel quia per nihil aliud in ejus notitiam devenitur, sicut dicuntur prima principia per se nota; vel quia non sunt cognoscibilia per accidens, sicut color est per se visibilis, substantia autem per accidens. (S. Th. 1.87.1. ad1m.)

31. Hoc nomen, *principium*, nihil aliud significat quam id a quo aliquid procedit. Omne enim a quo aliquid procedit quocumque modo, dicimus esse principium; et a converso. In rebus creatis aliquod principium primum innotescit dupliciter. Uno quidem modo inquantum est principium primum, per hoc quod habet relationem ad ea quae ab ipso sunt. Alio modo inquantum est primum principium, per hoc quod non est ab alio. (S. Th. 1. 33.1 c, et 4c.) This is the distinction between the first principles of a particular science, and first principles in an absolute sense.

32. Proprium objectum intellectus est *quod quid est.* Unde circa hoc non decipiter intellectus nisi per accidens; circa compositionem autem et divisionem decipitur. . . Compositio autem vel divisio operatio quaedam est intellectus. (C G 1.58.) This relation is set forth in a more detailed example in the commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics (sect. 605): Duplex est operatio intellectus: una, qua cognoscit quod quid est, quae vocatur indivisibilium intelligentia: alia, qua componit et dividit: in utroque est aliquid primum: in prima quidem operatione est aliquod primum, quod cadit in conceptione intellectus, scilicet hoc quod dico ens; nec aliquid hac operatione potest mente concipi, nisi intelligitur ens. Et quia hoc principium, impossibile est esse et non esse simul, dependet ex intellectu entis, sicut hoc principium, omne totum est majus sua parte, ex intellectu totius et partis: ideo hoc etiam principium est naturaliter primum in secunda operatione intellectus, scilicet componentis et dividentis. Nec aliquis potest secundum hanc operationem intellectus aliquid intelligere, nisi hoc principio intellecto. Sicut enim totum et partes non intelliguntur nisi intellecto ente, ita nec hoc principium omne totum est majus sua parte, nisi intellecto, praedicto principio firmissimo.

33. Ratiocinativa est nostra consideratio, quando ab una consideratione ad aliud transimus, sicut syllogisando a principiis in conclusiones. . . Ea quae naturaliter cognoscuntur, absque ratiocinatione, nobis sunt nota sicut de primis principiis patet. . . Absque rationis discursu comprehenduntur ea quorum species sunt in cognoscente. (C G 1.57.) This latter is an abstractive process. Supremum in nostra cognitione non est ratio, sed intellectus, qui est rationis origo. (*ibid.*)

34. Ratio et intellectus in homine non possunt esse diversae potentiae . . . Intelligere enim est simpliciter veritatem intelligibilem apprehendere; ratiocinari autem est procedere de uno intellecto ad aliud, ad veritatem intelligibilem cognoscendam . . . Homines ad intelligibilem veritatem cognoscendam perveniunt procedendo de uno ad aliud; et ideo rationales dicuntur. Patet ergo quod ratiocinari comparatur ad intelligere, sicut moveri ad quiescere, vel acquirere ad habere; quorum unum est perfecti, aliud autem imperfecti. Et quia motus semper ab immobili procedit, et ad aliquid quietum terminatur, inde est quod ratiocinatio humana secundum viam inquisitionis, vel inventionis procedit a quibusdam simpliciter intellectis, quae sunt prima principia; et rursus in via judicii resolvendo redit ad prima principia, ad quae inventa examinat. (S. Th. 1. 79. 8c.)

35. Intellectus divinus non est ratiocinativus aut discursivus. Non igitur potest esse in Ipso falsitas nec deceptio. (C G 1. 61.)

36. Intellectus in primis principiis non errat, sed in conclusionibus interdum, ad quas ex primis principiis ratiocinando pervadit. (C G 1.61.)

37. Sicut in intellectu ratiocinante comparatur conclusio ad principium, ita in intellectu componente et dividente comparatur praedicatum ad subjectum. Si enim intellectus noster statim in ipso principio videret conclusionis veritatem, numquam intelligeret discurrendo vel ratiocinando. Similiter si intellectus statim in apprehensione quidditatis subjecti habere notitiam de omnibus quae possunt attribui subjecto vel removeri ab eo; numquam intelligeret componendo et dividendo, sed solum intelligendo *quod quid est.* (S. Th. 1. 58. 4c.) Intellectus humanus necesse habet intelligere componendo et dividendo. Cum enim intellectus humanus exeat de potentia in actum, similitudinem quamdam habet cum rebus generabilibus, quae non statim perfectionem suam habent, sed eam successive acquirunt. Et similiter intellectus humanus non statim in prima apprehensione capit perfectam rei cognitionem; sed primo apprehendit aliquid de ipsa, puta quidditatem ipsius rei, quae est primum et proprium objectum intellectus; et deinde intelligit proprietates et accidentia, et habitudines circumstantes rei essentiam. Et secundum hoc necesse habet unum apprehensum alii componere et dividere, et ex una compositione et divisione ad aliam procedere; quod est ratiocinare . . . Et ideo intellectus humanus cognoscit componendo et dividendo, sicut et ratiocinando. (S. Th. 1. 85. 5c.) Intellectus autem circa quod quid est, semper verus est . . . Sed per accidens in nobis accidit deceptia et falsitas intelligendo quod quid est, scilicet secundum rationem alicujus compositionis; vel cum definitionem unius rei accipimus ut definitionem alterius; vel cum partes definitionis sibi non cohaerent. . . Et hoc quidem accidit in compositis quorum definitiones ex diversis sumuntur, quorum unum est materiale ad aliud. Sed intelligendo quidditates simplices non est falsitas; quia vel totaliter non attinguntur, et nihil intelligimus de eis, vel cognoscuntur ut sunt. . . Nam nos componendo et dividendo quandoque ad intellectum quidditatis pervenimus; sicut cum dividendo, et demonstrando, definitionem investigamus. (S. Th. 1. 58. 5c and cf. S. Th. 1. 85. 6.)

38. Veritas intellectus est adaequatio intellectus et rei, secundum quod intellectus dicit esse quod est, vel non esse quod non est. (C. G. 1.59). Intellectus enim nostri . . . duplex est operatio. Una qua format simplices rerum quidditates; ut quid est homo, vel quid est animal: in qua quidem operatione non invenitur verum per se nec falsum, sicut nec in vocibus incomplexis. Alia operatio intellectus est secundum quam componit et dividit, affirmando et negando: et in hac jam invenitur verum et falsum, sicut in voce complexa, quae est ejus signum. (De Ver. 14. 1c.)

39. Cum aliquod incomplexum vel dicitur vel intelligitur, ipsum quidem incomplexum, quantum est de se, non est rei aequatum, nec rei inaequale, cum aequalitas et inaequalitas secundum comparationem dicantur; incomplexum autem, quantum est de se non continet aliquam comparationem vel

applicationem ad rem; unde de se nec verum nec falsum dici potest; sed tantum complexum, in quo designatur comparatio incomplexi ad rem, per notam compositionis aut divisionis. Intellectus tamen incomplexus, intelligendo *quod quid est*, apprehendit quidditatem rei in quadam comparatione ad rem; quia apprehendit eam, ut hujus rei quidditatem. Unde, licet ipsum incomplexum, et etiam difinitio, non sit secundum se verum vel falsum, tamen intellectus, apprehendens *quod quid est*, dicitur quidem per se semper esse verus, . . . etsi per accidens possit esse falsus, in quantum definitio includit aliquam complexionem, vel partium definitionis ad invicem, vel totius definitionis ad definitum. Unde definitio dicetur (secundum quod intelligitur ut hujus vel illius rei definitio, secundum quod ab intellectu accipitur) vel simpliciter falsa, si partes definitionis non cohaereant in invicem, ut si dicatur animal insensible; vel falsa secundum hanc rem, prout definitio circuli accipitur ut trianguli. (*op. cit.* 1. 59.)

40. Praeteritio potest ad duo referri, scilicet ad objectum quod cognoscitur, et ad cognitionis actum. . . Quantum ad partem intellectivam pertinet, praeteritio accidit et non per se convenit ex parte objecti intellectus. Intelligit enim intellectus hominem, inquantum est homo. Homini autem, inquantum est homo, accidit vel in praesenti, vel in praeterito, vel in futuro esse. Ex parte vero actus, praeteritio per se accipi potest etiam in intellectu, sicut in sensu, quia intelligere animae nostrae est quidam particularis actus in hoc vel in illo tempore existens, secundum quod dicitur homo intelligere nunc, vel heri, vel cras. Et hoc non repugnat intellectualitati; quia hujusmodi intelligere, quamvis sit quoddam particulare tamen est immaterialis actus. Et ideo, sicut intelligit seipsum intellectus, quamvis ipse sit quidam singularis intellectus; ita intelligit suum intelligere, quod est singularis actus, vel in praeterito, vel in praesenti, vel in futuro existens. Sic igitur salvatur ratio memoriae, quantum ad hoc quod est praeteritorum in intellectu, secundum quod intelligit se prius intellexisse, non autem secundum quod intelligit praeteritum, prout est hic et nunc. (S. Th. 1. 79. 6 ad 2m.)

41. Manifestum est etiam quod potentiae sensitivae sunt nobis necessariae ad intelligendum non solum in acquisitione scientiae, sed etiam in utendo scientia jam acquisita. Non enim possumus considere etiam ea quorum scientiam habemus, nisi convertendo nos ad phantasmata. (De An. 15c.) (Intellectus) etiam postquam species intelligibiles abstraxerit non potest secundum eas actu intelligere, nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, in quibus species intelligibiles intelligit. (S. Th. 1. 86. 1c.)

42. Sic igitur si memoria accipiatur solum pro vi conservativa specierum, oportet dicere memoriam esse in intellectiva parte. (S. Th. 1. 79. 6c.) Scientia est in intellectu, qui est *locus specierum*. (S. Th. 1. 89. 5c.) Species conservatae in intellectu possibili in eo existunt habitualiter, quando actu non intelligit. (S. Th. 1. 84. 7. ad 1m.)

43. Si intellectus sine phantasmate non intelligit, quomodo ergo habebit operationem intellectualem, postquam fierit anima a corpora separata? scire debet qui haec objicit, quod istam questionem solvere non pertinet ad naturalem.

44. Avicenna ponit quod hoc non contingit (quod anima habitualiter teneat notitiam alicujus rei quam actu non considerat) ex hoc quod aliquae species conserventur in parte intellectiva; sed vult quod species actu non consideratae non possunt conservari nisi in parte sensitiva, vel quantum ad imaginationem, quae est thesaurus formarum a sensu acceptarum; vel quantum ad memoriam, quantum ad intellectiones particulares non acceptas a sensibus. In intellectu vero non permanet species, nisi quando actu consideratur; post considerationem vero in eo actu desinit: unde, quando iterum vult considerare aliquid, oportet quod species de novo fluant in intellectum ab intellectu agente. Nec tamen sequitur quod si aliquis de novo debet considerare quae prius scivit, oporteat eum iterum addiscere vel invenire sicut a principio, quia relicta est in eo quaedam habilitas per quam facilius se convertit ad intellectum agentem, ut ab eo species effluentes recipiat; et haec habilitas est habitus scientiae in nobis. Et secundum hanc opinionem memoria non esset in mente secundum retentionem aliquarum specierum, sed secundum habilitatem ad accipiendum de novo.

Sed ista opinio non videtur rationabilis. Primo, quia cum intellectus possibilis sit stabilioris naturae quam sensus, oportet quod species in eo recepta stabilius recipiatur; unde magis possunt in eo servari species quam in parte sensitiva.

Secundo, quia agens intelligentia aequaliter se habet ad influendum species convenientes scientiis omnibus. Unde si in intellectu non conservarentur aliquae species, sed sola habilitas convertendi se ad intellectum agentem, aequaliter remaneret homo habilis ad quodcumque intelligibile; et ita ex hoc quod homo addisceret unam scientiam, non magis sciret illam quam alias.

Praeterea, hoc videtur esse expresse contrarium sententiae Philosophi in III de Anima, qui commendat antiquos in hoc quod posuerunt animam esse locum specierum quantum ad intellectivam partem. [*loc. cit.*]

45. Omnis intellectus in habitu per aliquas species intelligit, nam habitus vel est habilitatio quaedam ad recipiendum species intelligibiles, quibus actu fiat intelligens; vel est ordinata aggregatio ipsorum specierum existentium in intellectu, non secundum completum actum, sed medio inter potentiam et actum. (C. G. 1. 56.)

46. Unumquodque sortitur speciem per propriam formam. Sed homo est homo in quantum est rationalis. Ergo anima rationalis est propria forma hominis. (De An. 1, Sed contra.) Anima intellectiva comparatur ad corpus ut forma ad materiam. (idem, 3, Sed Contr 2.) Sicut ergo de ratione animae

est quod sit forma corporis, ita de ratione hujus animae, in quantum est haec anima, est quod habet habitudinem ad hoc corpus. (De Sp. Cr. 9 ad4m.)

47. Intellectus successive multa considerantis impossible est esse unam tantum operationem. Cum enim operationes secundum objecta differant, oportebit diversam esse operationem intellectus, qua considerabatur primum et qua considerabatur secundum. . . Omnis intellectus intelligens unum post aliud, quandoque est intelligens in potentia et quandoque in actu, dum enim intelligit primum in actu, intelligit secundum in potentia. . . Successio sine tempore intelligi non potest, nec tempus sine motu; cum tempus sit numerus motus secundum prius et posterius. (C. G. 1. 55.)

48. Nihil est accipere in actu de tempore, nisi *nunc*. (S. Th. 1. 66. ad5m.) Quando sentimus *unum nunc*, et non discernimus in motu *prius* et *posterius*, non videtur fieri tempus, quia neque est motus; sed cum accipimus prius et posterius et numeramus ea, tunc dicimus fiere tempus, quia tempus nihil aliud est quam numerus motus secundum prius et posterius; tempus enim percipimus, ut dictum est cum *numeramus* prius et posterius in motu. (Com. Phys. IV lect 17.)

49. Nulla operatio potest multiplicari nisi dupliciter: vel ex parte objectorum, vel ex parte principii operantis: potest tamen addi et tertium ex parte temporis; sicut cum alia operatio recipit interpelationem temporum. Ipsum ergo intelligere, quod est operatio intellectus possibilis, potest quidem multiplicari secundum objecta, ut aliud sit intelligere hominem, aliud intelligere equum; et etiam secundum tempus, ut aliud sit numero intelligere quod fuit heri, et quod est hodie, si tamen discontinuetur operatio. (De An. 3 c.)

50. Quaecumque ergo intellectus potest intelligere sub una specie, simul intelligere potest. . . Quaecumque vero intellectus per diversas species intelligit non simul intelligit. (S. Th. 1. 85.4 c.)

51. Intellectus humanus se habet in genere rerum intelligibilium ut ens in potentia tantum, sicut et materia prima se habet in genere sensibilium; unde possibilis nominatur. Sic igitur in sua essentia consideratus se habet ut intelligat, non autem ut intelligatur, nisi secundum id quod fit actu. . . Sed quia connaturale est intellectui nostro secundum statum praesentis vitae quod ad materialia et sensibilia respiciat, consequens est ut sic seipsum intelligat intellectus noster, secundum quod fit actu per species a sensibilibus abstractas per lumen intellectus agentis, quod est actus ipsorum intelligibilium; et eis mediantibus intelligit intellectus possibilis. Non ergo per essentiam suam, sed per actum suum se cognoscit intellectus noster; et hoc dupliciter; uno quidem modo particulariter, secundum quod Socrates vel Plato percipit se habere animam intellectivam ex hoc quod percipit se intelligere. Alio modo in universali, secundum quod naturam humanae mentis ex actu intellectus consideramus. . . Est autem differentia inter has duas cognitiones

Nam ad primam cognitionem de mente habendam sufficit ipsa mentis praesentia, quae est principium actus, ex quo mens percipit seipsam; et ideo dicitur se cognoscere per suam praesentiam. Sed ad secundam cognitionem de mente habendam non sufficit ejus praesentia, sed requiritur diligens et subtilis inquisitio. (S. Th. 1.87 1 c). Intellectus humanus nec est suum intelligere nec sui intelligere est objectum primum ipsa ejus essentia, sed aliquid extrinsecum scilicet natura materialis rei. Et ideo id quod primo cognoscitur ab intellectu humano, est hujusmodi objectum; et secundario cognoscitur ipse actus, quo cognoscitur objectum; et per actum cognoscitur ipse intellectus, cujus est perfectio ipsum intelligere. (S. Th. 1.87.3 c.)

52. Intellectus noster nihil actu potest intelligere antequam a phantasmatibus abstrahat; nec etiam potest habere habitualem notitiam aliorum a se, quae scilicet in ipso non sunt, ante abstractionem praedictam, eo quod species aliorum intelligibilium non sunt ei innatae; sed essentia sua sibi innata est, ut non eam necesse habeat a phantasmatibus acquirere; sicut nec materiae essentia acquiritur ab agente naturali, sed solum ejus forma, quae ita comparatur ad materiam naturalem sicut forma intelligibilis ad materiam sensibilem. Et ideo mens antequam a phantasmatibus abstrahat, sui notitiam habitualem habet, qua possit percipere se esse. (De Ver. 10. 8 ad 1m.)

53. Est enim separatus, inquantum non est actus organi; non separatus vero, inquantum pars sive potentia animae quae est actus corporis. (De Un. Int.) Ex operatione animae humanae modus esse ipsius cognosci potest. Inquantum enim habet operationem materialia transcendentem, esse suum est supra corpus elevatum. (De An. 1. c.) Intellectum possibilem necesse est esse in potentia ad omnia quae sunt intelligibilia per hominem, et receptivum eorum, et per consequens denudatum ab his; quia omne quod est receptivum aliquorum et in potentia ad ea, quantum de se est, est denudatum ab eis . . . Homo autem natus est intelligere formas omnium sensibilium rerum. Oportet igitur intellectum possibilem esse denudatum;. . . et ita oportet quod non habeat aliquod organum corporeum. Si enim haberet aliquod organum corporeum, determinatur ad aliquam naturam sensibilem. (Idem, 2 c, et cf. 14.)

54. Dicimus quod lumen intellectus agentis, de quo Aristoteles loquitur, est nobis immediate impressum a Deo, secundum quod discernimus verum a falso, et bonum a malo . . . Sic igitur id quod facit in nobis intelligibilia actu per modum luminis participati, est aliquid animae, et multiplicatur secundum multitudinem animarum et hominum. Illud vero quod facit intelligibilia per modum solis illuminantis, est unum separatum, quod est Deus. . . . Supra sensum est virtus intellectiva, quae judicat de veritate, non per aliqua intelligibilia extra existentia, sed per lumen intellectus agentis, quod facit intelligibilia. Non multum autem refert dicere, quod ipsa

intelligibilia participantur a Deo, vel quod lumen faciens intelligibilia participetur. (De Sp. Cr. 10. c, et ad 8m.)

55. Operatio intellectus agentis est abstrahere species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus: quod quidem in nobis semper accidit. Non autem esset ratio quare haec abstractio quandoque fieret et quandoque non fieret, ut videtur, si intellectus agens esset substantia separata. Non est ergo intellectus substantia separata. (De An. 5, sed contra 2.)

56. Cognoscere prima intelligibilia est actio consequens speciem humanam. Unde oportet quod omnes homines communicent in virtute quae est principium hujus actionis; et haec est virtus intellectus agentis. Non tamen oportet quod sit eadem numero in omnibus; oportet tamen quod ab uno principio in omnibus derivetur. Et sic illa communicatio hominum in primis intelligibilibus demonstrat unitatem intellectus separati, quem Plato comparat soli; non autem unitatem intellectus agentis, quem Aristoteles comparat lumini. (S. Th. 1.79. 5 ad 3m.) As we have seen, the "sol" is God; the "lumen", the active intellect which is a faculty of the individual soul.

57. Cum veritas in intellectu sit adaequatio intellectus et rei, secundum quod intellectus dicit esse quod est, vel non esse quod non est, ad id in intellectu veritas pertinet quod intellectus dicit, non ad operationem qua id dicit. (C. G. 1.59.) Propositionis per intellectum componentem et dividentem formata compositio in ipso intellectu existit, non in re quae extra animam est. (C. G. 1. 58.) Licet verum proprie non sit in rebus, sed in mente, res tamen interdum vera dicitur, secundum quod actum propriae naturae consequitur; unde Avicenna dicit in sua Metaphysica, quod "veritas rei est proprietas esse uniuscujusque rei, quod stabilitum est rei," in quantum talis res nata est de se facere veram aestimationem, et in quantum proprium sui rationem, quae est in mente divina, imitatur. (C. G. 1.60.) Scientia intellectus humani a rebus quodammodo causatur; unde provenit quod sensibilia sunt mensura scientiae humanae: ex hoc enim verum est, quod intellectu dijudicatur, quia res ita se habet, et non e converso. . . Falsitas autem causata ex inaequalitate intellectus humani et rei, non est in rebus, sed in intellectu. (C. G. 1. 61.)

58. Infinitum cognitione repugnat, inquantum repugnat numeratione; nam partes infiniti numerari, secundum se, impossible est, quasi contradictionem implicans. Cognoscere autem aliquid, per numerationem suarum partium, est intellectus successive cognoscentis partem post partem, non autem intellectus simul diversas partes apprehendentis. Cum igitur divinus intellectus absque successione cognoscat omnia simul, non magis impeditur cognoscere infinita quam finita. (C. G. 1.69.)

59. Intellectus dicitur separatus, non sensus: quia intellectus remanet corrupto corpore in anima separata, non autem potentiae sensitivae. Vel melius dicendum, quod intellectus pro tanto dicitur separatus, quia non utitur organo corporali in operatione sua, sicut sensus. (De An. 2, ad 1m.)

60. Sed secundum hoc jam difficilius est videre, quomodo anima separata intelligere possit. Non enim erunt phantasmata, quae indigent ad sui apprehensionem et conversationem organis corporeis; quibus sublatis, ut videtur, non potest intelligere anima; sicut nec coloribus sublatis, potest visus videre. Ad hanc igitur difficultatem tollendam considerendum est, quod anima, cum sit infima in ordine intellectivarum substantiarum, infimo et debilissimo modo participat intellectuale lumen, sive intellectualem naturam. Nam in primo intelligente, scilicet Deo, natura intellectualis est adeo potens quod per unam formam intelligibilem, scilicet essentiam suam, omnia intelligit; inferiores vero substantiae intellectuales per species multas; et quanto unaquaeque earum est altior, tanto habet pauciores formas, et virtutem magis potentem ad intelligendum omnia per formas paucas. Si autem substantia intellectualis inferior haberet formas ita universales sicut superior; cum non adsit ei tanta virtus in intelligendo, remaneret ejus scientia incompleta; quia tantum in universali res cognosceret, et non posset deducere cognitionem suam ex illis paucis ad singula. Anima ergo humana, quae est infima, si acciperet formas in abstractione et universalitate conformes substantiis separatis; cum habeat minimam virtutem in intelligendo, imperfectissimam cognitionem haberet, utpote cognoscens res in quadam universalitate et confusione. Et ideo ad hoc quod ejus cognitio perficiatur, et distinguatur per singula, oportet quod a singulis rebus scientiam colligat veritatis: lumine tamen intellectus agentis ad hoc necessario existente, ut altiori modo recipiantur in anima quam sint in materia. Ad perfectionem igitur intellectualis operationis necessarium fuit animam corpori uniri. Nec tamen dubium est quin per motus corporeos et occupationem sensuum anima impeditur a receptione influxus substantiarum separatarum; unde dormientibus et alienatis a sensibus quaedum revelationes fiunt quae non accidunt sensu utentibus. Quando ergo anima erit a corpore totaliter separata, plenius percipere poterit influentiam a superioribus substantiis, quantum ad hoc quod per hujusmodi influxum intelligere poterit absque phantasmate, quod modo non potest; sed tamen hujusmodi influxus non causabit scientiam ita perfectam et ita determinatam ad singula, sicut est scientia quam hic accipimus per sensus; nisi in illis animabus quae supra dictum naturalem influxum habebunt alium supernaturalem ad omnia plenissime cognoscenda, et ad ipsum Deum videndum. Habebunt etiam animae separatae determinatam cognitionem eorum quae prius hic sciverunt, quorum species intelligibiles conservantur in eis. (De An. 15, Resp.)

61. Beatitudo nominat adeptionem perfecti boni. Quicumque ergo est capax perfecti boni, potest ad beatitudinem pervenire. Quod autem homo boni perfecti sit capax, ex hoc apparet, quod ejus intellectus potest comprehendere universale et perfectum bonum, et ejus voluntas appetere illud; et ideo homo potest beatitudinem adipisci. Apparet etiam idem ex hoc quod

homo est capax visionis divinae essentiae, in qua quidem visione perfectam hominis beatitudinem consistere diximus. (St. Th. 1. 2. 5. 1c.) Perfecta beatitudo in consideratione scientiarum speculativarum essentialiter consistere non potest. Ad cujus evidentiam considerandam est quod consideratio speculativae scientiae non se extendit ultra virtutem principiorum illius scientiae: quia in principiis scientiae virtualiter tota scientia continetur. Prima autem principia scientiarum speculativarum sunt per sensum accepta . . . Unde relinquitur quod hominis ultima beatitudo non possit esse in consideratione speculativarum scientiarum. Sed sicut in formis sensibilibus participatur aliqua similitudo substantiarum superiorum; ita consideratio scientiarum speculativarum est quaedam participatio verae et perfectae beatitudinis. (S. Th. 1. 2. 3. 6c.) Ultima et perfecta beatitudo non potest esse nisi in visione divinae essentiae. . . Homo non est perfecte beatus quamdiu restat ei aliquid desiderandum et quaerendum. . . Si igitur intellectus humanus cognoscens essentiam alicujus effectus creati, non cognoscat de Deo nisi an est, nondum perfectio ejus attingit simpliciter ad causam primam, sed remanet ei adhuc naturale desiderium inquirendi causam; unde nondum est perfecte beatus. Ad perfectam igitur beatitudinem requiritur quod intellectus pertingat ad ipsam essentiam primae causae. Et sic perfectionem suam habebit per unionem ad Deum sicut ad objectum, in quo solo beatitudo hominis consistit. (*idem*, 8 c).

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

The following writings of St. Thomas have been utilized in the preparation of this study:

Summa Theologica
Summa Contra Gentiles
Questiones Disputatae
- De Anima
- De Spiritualibus Creaturis
- De Veritate

Opuscula
- De Ente et Essentia
- De Unitate Intellectus

Commentariae in opera Aristotelis
- In Metaphysicam
- In Librum Physicorum
- De Anima

In references the abbreviations of titles are self-explanatory. For sections: in the Summa Theologica, the part, the question, article and section of article follow in order, eg. S. Th. 1. 76. 3c—Summa Theologica, part one, question 76, article 3, body of article. In the Summa Contra Gentiles, book and chapter are indicated. In the other writings, as detailed reference as the structure of the treatise admits.

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